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PLAYING THE LOTTERY: HCBS
LAWSUITS AND OTHER MEDICAID
LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF THE
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED
MargaretK. Feltzt
LITIGATION CONCERNING Medicaid-funded services
for individuals with developmental disabilities has dramatically
increased in recent decades. Generally speaking, two categories
of litigation have emerged. Initially, Medicaid litigation focused
on the improvement of institutional services for mentally retarded/developmentally disabled (MR/DD) individuals.' However, as the location for care provisions shifted from the institution to the home/community, there has been a parallel shift in
the litigation focus. Recent Medicaid litigation has concentrated
on the expansion of home and community-based service systems. With the majority of Medicaid-eligible individuals now
receiving services outside of the institutional setting, litigation
of the past few years has revolved around the prompt provision
of appropriate care in home and community environments.
This Note will discuss the maturation of Medicaid-funded
care delivery as embodied in home and community-based care
modalities. Litigation has been an essential tool and a driving
force in carving out home and community-based services for
developmentally disabled individuals. But, was litigation the
most effective tool to achieve these gains? If so, does it cont Health Law Associate, McDermott, Will & Emery, Boston, Massachusetts.
B.A., 1995, Wellesley College. M.A., 1996, Case Western Reserve University. J.D.,
2001, Case Western Reserve University. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to
David S. Friedman, Esq. (Hill & Barlow, Boston, Mass.), Gail Grossman (Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation, Boston, Mass.), and Professor Louise W.
McKinney (Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio) for
valuable commentary and guidance in developing this Note. I also thank my family
for their continued support and encouragement throughout my education.

1Theselawsuits date back three decades, to the 1970's. For examples of institution-based Medicaid litigation see infra PartILA.
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tinue to be the most effective tool? What problems have arisen
as a result of employing a litigation approach to securing Medicaid home and community-based services? What alternatives
are there to litigation and how effective are they? How might
these alternatives be made more effective? Would a combination of approaches produce greater benefit?
By way of providing background, Part I of this Note will2
supply a primer on the Health Care Financing Administration'S
home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver program.
Part II will discuss the current litigation climate with regard to
Medicaid-funded services for the developmentally disabled and
will discuss the relevant law with regard to Medicaid litigation.
Part III will discuss a recent Massachusetts case, Boulet v. Cellucci, and will use the Massachusetts experience as a case study
for dissecting the litigation approach to securing Medicaid services for the developmentally disabled. Part IV will discuss
widespread challenges inherent in HCBS waiver programs and
will analyze various approaches to securing Medicaid services.
In addition, this section will provide recommendations for advocates seeking to protect and provide for the needs of developmentally disabled individuals.

PART I: HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED
SERVICES PRIMER
A. Creation of a Medicaid HCBS Waiver
Under § 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, States are allowed to request waivers of certain federal requirements in order to create alternative care and treatment modalities that are
Medicaid-financed. 3 "Waivers are intended to provide the flexibility needed to enable States to try new or different approaches
to the efficient and cost-effective delivery of health care services, or to adapt their programs to the special needs of particu-

2 As of July 1, 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., INTRODUCING CMS (n.d.),

at http'//cms.hhs.gov/about/reorg.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2001). Much of this Note's
source material was cited when the agency was still HCFA and is titled as such.
Thus, this Note will still refer to the agency as the Health Care Financing Administration for the purpose of uniformity and a desire to not confuse the reader.
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (West Supp. 2001).
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lar areas or groups of recipients." 4 Waiver can be obtained with
regard to three different requirements: services need not be provided statewide;5 States can use more liberal financial eligibility
criteria; 6 and designated groups can be given benefits that other
groups are not eligible to receive. 7
First authorized in 1981, HCBS waivers have become the
primary mechanism for States to provide Medicaid-funded,
community-based, long-term care services to the mentally retarded, mentally ill, developmentally disabled, physically disabled, and other target populations. In allowing for HCBS
waivers, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has
afforded States the "flexibility to develop and implement creative alternatives to placing Medicaid-eligible individuals in
hospitals, nursing facilities, or intermediate care facilities." 9
The Social Security Act specifically lists the services that may
be provided via HCBS waiver programs as follows:
[C]ase management services, homemaker/home health
aide services and personal care services, adult day
health services, habilitation services, respite care, and
such other services requested by the State as the Secretary may approve and for day treatment or other partial
hospitalization services, psychosocial rehabilitation services, and clinic services (whether or not furnished10in a
facility) for individuals with chronic mental illness.
The rationale behind the waiver program is that by providing
these and other HCFA-approved services,11 the goal of preserv442 C.F.R. § 430.25(b) (2000).
5 See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(1) (requiring a state plan for medical assistance
to be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State).
6See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(l1 (requiring that a State employ a single standard in determining income and resource eligibility).
7 See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (relating to comparability of services requirements).
8 STEVEN LuTZKY ET AL., LEWIN GROUP, INC., REVIEW OF THE MEDICAID
HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM LITERATURE
AND PROGRAM DATA 1 (June 2000), http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/litfinal.pdf.
9HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-

1915(c)

VICES, HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 1915(C) WAIVERS
1 (n.d.), at
http'/www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hpg4.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2001) [hereinafter
HCBS].
'042 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(4)(B).
1 HCFA maintains broad discretion over the approval of additional services
in a state waiver proposal. For example, in-home support services or special commu-
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ing the independence of developmentally disabled individuals
will be achieved. Mentally retarded/developmentally disabled
individuals will be allowed to remain in the community, maintaining emotional ties to both family and friends, thereby improving their quality of life.
While a State's HCBS waiver proposal must be HCFAapproved, States retain great latitude in determining the composition and construction of a waiver. 12 Both medical and nonmedical services may be included under an HCBS waiver. Some
States have included the following services in their HCBS program applications: adult day care, adult day habilitation services, adult day health services, adaptive equipment, case management, personal care attendant services, habilitation services,
homemaker services, home health aide services, nursing care
services, personal care services, respite care, family training,
day treatment, and vocational services. 13 Individual States maintain broad discretion as to both the services that are included
and the populations that are served under the state waiver. The
design of the program and the selection of services under the
waiver are state-specific and services can be provided either on
a statewide basis or according to specific geographic designations and/or population definitions.' 4 Federal regulations provide for HCBS waiver programs to serve target populations
such as the elderly, 15 persons with physical disabilities, devel-16
opmental disabilities, mental retardation, and mental illness.
Finally, States can design HCBS waiver proposals according to
specific conditions or illnesses, such as limiting services to insuffer from acdividuals who are ventilator-dependent or who
17
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).
nication services might be provided pursuant to HCFA approval. HCBS, supra note
9,1 3.
12GARY A. SMITH, NAT'L ASS'N ST. DIRECTORS DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABILI-

TIES SERVS., INC., STATUS REPORT: LITIGATION CONCERNING MEDICAID SERVICES FOR

PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES § II (Apr. 2001), http'//www.
qualitymall.orglonline/litigation.html.
13LUrziKy ET AL., supra note 8, at 15-16.
4 See generally42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (governing waiver programs).
,5 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(d) (providing for home and community-based
services for the elderly).
16HCBS, supra note 9, 5; see generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (governing
waiver programs).
See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396n(e) (permitting waiver programs for children who
are infected with AIDS or are drug-dependent at birth); see generally 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396n (governing waiver programs).
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States are permitted to determine not only the groups of
individuals that are covered under a particular waiver, but are
also permitted to determine the maximum number of individuals
to whom the State will offer services under the guise of a
waiver plan.' 8 Commonly known as a waiver "cap," federal
proposal may not be limmandates require that a HCBS waiver
9
ited to fewer than 200 individuals.1
Although a State is allowed tremendous flexibility in the
creation of an HCBS waiver proposal, the State must assure
HCFA that in implementing the waiver, the cost of providing
home and community-based services will not exceed the cost of
care in an institutional setting on a per capita basis. 20 Similarly,
once HCFA has approved the State's HCBS waiver proposal,
the State is obligated to provide all the listed services in accordance with Federal Medicaid regulations and guidelines. 2 '
States must also assure HCFA that there are adequate safeguards in place to protect the health and welfare of individuals
served under the waiver.22
B. Current Status of HCBS Waiver Programs in the United
States
As Gary Smith, Director of Special Projects for the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services, Inc., has reported, the last thirty years have seen a
steady trend toward increased Medicaid funding coupled with
unprecedented Medicaid enrollment. 23 Discretionary decisionmaking on the part of state legislators and Medicaid directors
has resulted in the expanded availability of services and sup18 See

42 U.S.C.A § 1396n(c)(10) (establishing minimum guidelines for

waiver caps).
19
L

20 HCBS, supra note 9, 6; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (permitting a
waiver provided that "under such waiver the average per capita expenditure estimated
by the State in any fiscal year for medical assistance provided with respect to such
individuals does not exceed 100 percent of the average per capita expenditure that the
State reasonably estimates would have been made in that fiscal year for expenditures
under the State plan for such individuals if the waiver had not been granted").
21 E.g., Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Cir. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 698 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that "when a state elects to provide an optional service, that service becomes part of the state Medicaid plan and is subject to the requirements of federal law").
22 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(A).
23 SMrrH, supra note 12, § II (stating that despite increased funding for community services, waiting lists for services have emerged).
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ports, requiring additional appropriations by the State. Looking
for creative ways to provide quality care and save (or better allocate) funds, many States have reduced or eliminated institutional placements in favor of home and community-based services programs.
The 1990's saw a "massive infusion" of funding into community service systems, principally via HCFA's HCBS waiver
mechanism. 24 HCFA's first HCBS waiver program was approved in 1981.25 As of December 2000, there were 240 waiver
programs in the United States. 26 Indeed, every State was represented in this count except for Arizona, which operates the
equivalent of a HCBS waiver program under the Social Security
Act's § 1115 "demonstration waiver" program.27 Between 1990
and 1999, the number of individuals receiving services under
the auspices of HCBS waivers increased from 45,000 to
262,000.28 At the same time, there was a ten-fold increase in
Medicaid spending during this decade, reaching a total of $8.4
billion in 1999.29
Many States fear that the movement toward HCBS waiver
programs may cause a "woodwork effect"-meaning that individuals who are currently being provided services and care by
family members will 'come out of the woodwork' and apply for
30
Medicaid community-based services through HCBS waivers.
Indeed, this prediction may turn out to be true. Many families
are experiencing intense frustration as they try to secure muchneeded Medicaid-funded HCBS services for a developmentally
disabled family member, while resisting placing that family
member in a long-term care institution. Despite States' clear
penchants for HCBS care modalities, lengthy waitlists and in241a

2 HCBS, supra note 9, 1 8.
26id
27a

2 SMITH, supra note 12,

§ It; see also MANJU KULKARNI,

NAT'L HEALTH LAW

PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: ACCESSING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SER-

vICES § llA (Mar. 2000) (describing a 200,000 person increase in those persons re-

ceiving home and community-based services based on waiver programs between
1990-1998), httpJ/www.healthlaw.org/pubs/2000003FactSheethcbw.html.
29 SMITH, supra note 12, § 11.
30 KULKARNI, supra note 28, § I; JANE PERKINS & MANJU KULKARNI, NAT'L
HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: ADDRESSING HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED
WAIVER WAITING LISTS THROUGH THE MEDICAID PROGRAM

www.healthlaw.org/docs/200005FactSheethcbw.pdf.

1 (May 2000) httpJ/
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sufficient caps 31 leave many otherwise eligible beneficiaries

without appropriate Medicaid-funded long-term care services.
This dearth of sufficient, timely, and appropriate services has
prompted many families to turn to litigation as a means of securing community-based, Medicaid-funded, long-term care services on behalf of a mentally retarded/developmentally disabled
family member.

PART H: LITIGATION CLIMATE AND RELEVANT
LAW
A. Background
Thirty years ago, litigation concerning Medicaid services
focused on reforms within institutions that provided long-term
care services to individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. 32 The early 1970's saw numerous cases
alleging violations of the civil rights of institutionalized individuals with MR/DD.33 The vast majority of these cases alleged
that individuals were being forced to live in inhumane environments where neglect and physical, mental, emotional, and sexual abuse abounded. The 1970's saw the filing of at least
twenty-one cases of this type. 34 The following decade saw an
even greater proliferation of lawsuits, with at least thirty-two
such cases being filed.3 5

Class action lawsuits of a different sort emerged in the
early 1990's. While the allegations of mistreatment from the
31

For information on caps, see supra LA and infra BILC.4.
See LuTzKY ET AL., supranote 8, at 4 (listing the most influential cases).
33
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (holding the constitutional rights of mentally retarded residents at a stateoperated institution were violated due to inadequate rehabilitation), affd in part,
rev'd in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that mentally retarded students who carried hepatitis B were entitled to readmission to special education programs in public schools), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1979); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502-03 (D. Minn. 1974) (holding
involuntary committed patients have a right, grounded in due process or the Eighth
Amendment, to a humane and safe living environment), affd, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir.
1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding involuntarily
committed patients have a constitutional right to receive individual treatment that
provides a realistic opportunity for improvement of their condition), affd in part,
reversed in partsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
34 LuTrzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
35id.
32
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previous twenty years had not been eradicated, a new litigation
focus materialized and the lawsuits of the 1990's revolved
around the location of care delivery and the promptness of service delivery. 36 This paradigm shift was due, in large part, to a
deinstitutionalization trend. A strong advocacy movement intent
on improving the quality of life of MR/DD individuals by mainstreaming them and striving to maintain their emotional, familial, educational, and residential ties with the community also
had a profound impact.
B. Current Lawsuits
With the tremendous influx of federal and State Medicaid
funding, a movement away from providing services in the institutional setting, and a concurrent upsurge in the demand for
community-based Medicaid services, the Medicaid environment
of the 1990's was ripe for litigation. Dual goals emerged as the
litigation objective focused on securing prompt access to longterm care services for the MR/DD individual and ensuring that
such services were delivered in the most appropriate setting.
While some States developed multi-year initiatives to address
the needs of MR/DD Medicaid beneficiaries, 37 other States
failed to answer the call and many individuals in need of Medicaid-funded services fell through the cracks. Disability advocates wielded the tools provided to them in the Federal Medicaid Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Services Act of 1973, and the United States Constitution, in attempts to obtain prompt and appropriate services in
the most integrated setting. Gary Smith has described the resulting litigation climate as having produced three interrelated categories of lawsuits: waiting list lawsuits, Olmstead lawsuits, and
access to benefits lawsuits. 38 As Smith notes, these three litigation approaches are far from distinct; frequently a particular
lawsuit will include arguments from two or even all three of
these categories. Smith's analysis, however, allows a clear
framework for dissecting and examining lawsuits aimed at securing Medicaid-funded services for disabled individuals.
36

See id. at 4-5 (describing the Americans with Disabilities Act's requirement
that services be provided in the 'most integrated setting appropriate', its implication
on the waiver program, and subsequent cases).
37 For example, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland have done so. SMITH,
supra note 12, § IL
38 1i § I.
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Figure 1: Types of Medicaid-Related Litigation3 9
Description
Type of Suit
Waiting List Lawsuits

Allege that a State has failed to provide long-term Medicaid services
with 'reasonable promptness' to otherwise eligible persons with developmental disabilities.

"Olmstead Lawsuits"

Access to
Lawsuits

Benefits

Allege that institutionalized persons
have been improperly denied an opportunity to receive services in 'the
most integrated setting.'
Allege that Medicaid recipients have
not been provided with or have been
unable to access services that they
have been authorized to receive.

1. Waiting List Lawsuits
Waiting list lawsuits typically assert that a State has violated federal law in failing to provide Medicaid-funded, longterm services with reasonable promptness to otherwise eligible
individuals with developmental disabilities. 40 As of March
2001, there were waiting list lawsuits in fifteen states. 41 Settlement agreements had been reached in five lawsuits and litigation was pending in eleven states.42

39

Information adapted from SMIrH, supra note 12, § L

40 See generally iU § Im (describing arguments and cases falling into the wait-

ing list category).
41 Id § MIIB; see also fig.2.
42
See fig.2 (indicating settlement agreements with an asterisk).
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Figure 2: Waiting List Lawsuits as of March 200143
Lawsuit

Medicaid

ADA

§ 504

Law
Carpenter

v.

X

14th

Description

Am.
X

X

X

Filed in the U.S. District

Alaska Dep't of

Court for the District of

Health and Soc.

Alaska, this suit asserted

Servs. (Alaska).

that the State's waitlisting

Brought in Jan.

practice violates the ADA

2001 by private

integration mandate and the

attorney

reasonable

behalf

on

promptness

of fif-

provision of Federal Medi-

named

caid law. Additionally, the

teen
plaintiffs.

State's failure to properly
process Medicaid applications denies due process.

Mandy

R.

Owens

(Colo-

for the District of Colorado,

Brought

this complaint pertained to

rado).
in

Aug.

v.

X

X

X

X

Filed in U.S. District Court

2000

the state practice of waitlist-

by private at-

ing individuals for residen-

torney and the

tial services. Approximately

Are

of Colo-

2,700 individuals have been

rado as a class

affected by this practice.

action.

The State has filed a motion
for dismissal.

John/Jane Does

X

Filed on behalf of individu-

v. Bush origi-

als waitlisted for ICF/MR

nally

as

services, this case became

Does v. Chiles)

the prototype for subsequent

(Florida).

waiting list and "reasonable

filed

Brought

in

promptness" suits. In March

1992 as a class

1998, the Court of Appeals

action.

for the

Eleventh

Circuit

upheld the district

court

ruling that a waitlist for
ICFIMR services
Federal
There

violated

Medicaid

law.

has been no final

disposition of the case.

43 Information adapted from SMrrIH, supra note 12, § HLB.

20021
Wolf
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v.

A settlement agreement has
been reached in this case, in

(Flor-

which the State has agreed

Prado-

Steinman
Bush

to serve all individuals who

ida).*

were waiting for services on
July 1, 1999 by 2001. Additionally, the State is in the
process of negotiating a §
waiver agree-

1915(b)/(c)

ment with HCFA to provide
expanded access to HCBS
services for eligible individuals.
Makin v. State

This complaint alleged that

(Hawaii)*

a waitlist for HCBS services

Brought in Dec.

violated Federal Medicaid

1998 by Hawaii

law and ADA mandates. In

and

Protection
Agency

as

class action.

a

a settlement

April 2000,
agreement

Advocacy

was

reached

wherein the State agreed to
increase

the

number

of

individuals who would be
served in the HCBS waiver
program by approximately
70% over a three-year period. The state legislature
approved an additional $4.3
million in funding to underwrite
expansion.

initial

stage

of
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r

v.

Filed in the U.S. District

Ryan (Illinois).

Court for the District of
Northern Illinois, this suit

in

Brought

Sept. 2000 by

alleged

five

named

reasonable

promptness

with

provision.

Additionally,

plaintiffs
MR/DD.

violation

of the

plaintiffs claimed that the
State has not allowed eligible individuals freedom of
choice in selecting between
ICF/MR and HCBS waiver
services. The State has filed
a motion to dismiss, which
has not yet been ruled upon.

Boulet v. Cellucci

(origi-

X

X

Pertaining

to

residential

services, this case asserted a

nally filed

as

violation

Anderson

v.

reasonable

of

Medicaid's
promptness

Cellucci) (Mas-

provision.

sachusetts)*

3,000 individuals comprised
in

Brought
Mar.
private

1999 by

the

Approximately

proposed

plaintiffs'

class. In July 2000,

the

attor-

District Court issued sum-

neys on behalf

mary judgment in plaintiffs'

of five named

favor. The proposed class

plaintiffs as a

definition was narrowed and

class action.

the State was directed to
furnish residential services
to class

members

within

ninety days unless able to
"show cause" why doing so
was not feasible. In November

2000,

a

settlement

agreement was reached in
principle, which was finalized on December 19, 2000.
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Travis

D.

Eastmont

v.
Hu-

X

This suit alleged that the
State

failed

to

provide

man Servs. Ctr.

HCBS waiver services to

(Montana).

approximately

Filed in May

listed

by

1998

Montana
tection

600

waitin

individuals

the

the

community along with resi-

Pro-

dents of the State's two
public MR/DD institutions.

and

Advocacy

Settlement discussions are

Agency.

reportedly underway in this
case.

Lewis v. New

This suit alleged that the

Mexico

State's failure to provide

Dep't

services in the

of Health (New

Medicaid

Mexico). Filed

community to eligible dis-

in Jan. 1999 by

abled

the New Mex-

them to either go without

ico

Protection

services or to seek those

and

Advocacy

services only in an institu-

Agency and the

tional

setting.

of

mately

1,750

Are

Mexico.

New

caused

individuals

Approxiindividuals

with developmental disabilities were on the waiting list
for services in 1999; the
entire class of affected individuals

numbers

greater

than 3,000. In April 2000,
the

federal district

court

rejected the State's motion
to dismiss and upheld the
plaintiffs' right to access to
HCBS waiver services with
"reasonable
promptness."
New Mexico has filed a
motion of intent to appeal
the district court decision to
the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Denver, CO
based on a sovereign immunity claim under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
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Martin v. Taft

This complaint pertained to

(originally filed

the

as

residential

Martin

v.

Voinovich)

prompt

provision

of

services

to

Medicaid-eligible individu-

(Ohio). Filed in

als. In

1998, the parties

the

agreed to motion to stay

Ohio Protection

further district court pro-

and

Advocacy

ceedings. However, in July

as

2000, the Ohio Protection

by

1989

Agency

a

class action.

and Advocacy Agency filed
a motion for partial summary judgment asking the
court to find that the State is
violating Federal Medicaid
law

because

the

waiver

waiting list is not "moving
at a reasonable pace." It was
anticipated

that the

case

would go to trial in 2001.
Staley v. Kitz-

This complaint alleged a

haber

(Ore-

failure to furnish with rea-

gon)*

Filed

sonable promptness Medi-

Jan. 2000 as a

caid long-term services to

class action.

otherwise eligible individuals. In September 2000, the
parties agreed to settle the
suit, agreeing to implement
Oregon's "Universal Access
Plan."

Submitted to the

Oregon legislature in February 2000, the agreement
provides for a cumulative
total of $350 million by
2007.
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Gross v. Hous-

This complaint alleged that

ton

(Pennsyl-

the State failed to provide

vania). Filed in

ICF/MR or equivalent resi-

July 1999 as a

dential

class action.

instead to waitlist eligible

services,

individuals.

opting

Court-related

activity has been suspended
as a result of the Governor's
commitment to provide an
additional $850 million in
funding over the course of
the next five years.
v.

Filed in the U.S. District

(now

Court for the Eastern Dis-

Protec-

trict of Pennsylvania, this

tion and Advo-

suit pertained to state im-

Delong
Houston
Penn.

Inc.

cacy,

v.

of the Per-

plementation

Houston (Penn-

son/Family

sylvania). Filed

ports waiver

in Aug.

2000

component in the State's

by the Disabil-

waitlist reduction initiative.

Law Pro-

The suit contended that the

Pennsyl-

State was required to pro-

Protec-

vide services to 3,392 per-

tion and Advo-

sons during 1999-2000, but

cacy Project.

failed to allocate a suffi-

ity
ject;

vania

Directed Supprogram,

a

cient number of slots under
the cap, thereby denying
services to otherwise eligible individuals. The State
filed a motion to dismiss the
suit, which was denied in
March 2001.
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Brown v. The

This complaint alleged that

Tennessee

the State failed to provide

Dep't of Mental

ICF/MR or HCBS waiver

Health

services

and

with

reasonable

Developmental

promptness

Disabilities and

mately 850 otherwise eligi-

Rukeyser (Ten-

ble

nessee).

MR/DD.

Filed

to

approxi-

individuals

with

in July 2000 by
the

Tennessee

Protection

and

Advocacy Project as a class
action.
People First of

X

X

X

Filed in the U.S. District

Tenn. v. Neal

Court for the Middle Dis-

(Tennessee).

trict

Filed

complaint alleged that some

in

Mar.

of Tennessee,

this

2001 by People

2,000

First

MR/DD are currently and

of Ten-

nessee

as

a

class action.

individuals

improperly

with

waitlisted

for

HCB services, despite under-enrollment based on the
state-established cap.

Quibuyen
Allen

v.

Filed in the U.S. District

(Vir-

Court for the District of

ginia). Filed in

Virginia,

Dec. 2000 by a

alleged that Virginia has

coalition

imposed

attorneys.

of

furnishing

this

complaint

restrictions
HCBS

on

waiver

services, resulting in unreasonable wait lists.

2002]
The

PLAYING THE LOTTERY
of

This complaint alleged that

Wash. State v.

Arc

the waitlist for long-term

Lyle

care services to individuals

Quasim

(Washington).

with MR/DD violates Fed-

Filed in Nov.

eral Medicaid law and the

1999 as a class
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the District Court granted
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plaintiffs'
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defense.

The

plaintiffs plan to raise arguments related to service
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Benjamin H. v.

Pertaining to long-term care

Ohl

services, this suit alleged

(West

Virginia)*
Filed
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that services were not being
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provided

with

reasonable

1999 as a class

promptness. In July 1999,

action.

the District Court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and
the defendants were ordered
to develop

a compliance

plan that would: (1) eliminate the waiting lists, (2)
establish

reasonable

time

frames for placing persons
into the waiver program, (3)
allow for freedom of choice,
(4) develop written policies
and

procedures,

and

(5)

develop a plan for fair hearings.

In March 2000, the

court approved an agreement pertaining to this order.
*

Settlement agreements reached by December 2000.

Waiting list lawsuits directly challenge the viability and legality of a State maintaining a waiting list for Medicaid-funded
services. Provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act
(Federal Medicaid law), Title II of the ADA, and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Services Act of 1973 all provide grounds for
challenging state-generated waiting lists for Medicaid-funded
services. Similarly, advocates have found a litigation vehicle in
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Generally, waiting list lawsuits rely on Title XIX's requirement that States promptly provide Medicaid services to all
eligible individuals. Plaintiffs typically argue that the defen44 A discussion of 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clause
arguments relevant to waiting list lawsuits is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
discussion of the legal issues concerning reasonable promptness provisions, see
NAT'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, REASONABLE PROMPTNESS AND THE PROVISION OF
SERVICES UNDER MEDICAID (n.d.), http'//www.healthlaw.org/pubs/200101prompt

ness.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
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dants (usually the state agency that administers Medicaid, the
commissioner(s) of the Medicaid Department, and/or the Department of Mental Retardation, the governor, and others) have
caused unreasonable delay in the provision of institutional or
HCBS waiver services in violation of § 1396a(a)(8) and other
federal and state laws. 45 Section 1396a(a)(8), the so-called "reasonable promptness provision" of the Medicaid Act, specifically
requires that "[a] State plan for medical assistance mustprovide that all individuals wishing to make application for
medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do
so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable
' 6
promptness to all eligible individuals.A
Accompanying regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) obligate the State to
"[f]urnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay
caused by the agency's administrative procedures," and
"[c]ontinue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals until they are found to be ineligible." 47 Similarly regulations mandate that "[t]he agency must establish time standards
for determining eligibility and inform the applicant of what they
are."'48 The outer limits on such time standards are determined
by regulations not to exceed "[n]inety days for applicants who
apply for Medicaid on the basis of disability," and "[florty-five
days for all other applicants. ' 49 Regulations also unambiguously
establish that an agency "must not use the time standards" as a
"waiting period" for Medicaid services.5 0
Courts have consistently held that § 1396a(a)(8) of the
Medicaid Act is enforceable under a § 1983 action. 5'Section
1983 imposes liability on anyone who, acting under the color of
state law, deprives a person of "any rights, privileges, or immu45 See generally SMITH, supra note 12, § Ui.B (describing waiting list litiga-

tion).
46 42 U.S.C.A § 1396(a)(8) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
47 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a)-(b)(2000).
48 Id § 435.911(a).

49 I. § 435.911(a)(1)-(2).
50 LI § 435.911(e)(1).
51See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 715-19 (11th Cir. 1998); Lewis v.
New Mexico Dep't of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1232-36 (D.N.M. 2000); Sobky
v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1146-47 (E.D. Cal. 1994); see also Albiston v. Maine
Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258, 265 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a "reasonable
promptness" requirement in the statute governing Aid to Families with Dependent
Children creates rights enforceable under § 1983).
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nities secured by the Constitution and laws. 5 2 In Blessing v.
Freestone53 the court clarified the conditions under which an
individual might seek redress through a § 1983 action: "a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a
violation of federal law."54 The court further expounded:
We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives
rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right
assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and
amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words,
the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be
couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.55
A seminal case in waitlist litigation was Doe v. Chiles.56 In
this case, pursuant to § 1396 and its accompanying regulations,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Federal
Medicaid law does not permit a State to indefinitely waitlist individuals for Medicaid-funded services. The Doe court ruled
that Medicaid institutional services (i.e., services provided in a
nursing home or an intermediate care facility for the mentally
retarded 57 ("ICF/MR") were no different than any other nonwaiver Medicaid service. The court mandated that Medicaidfunded services-whether they were provided under the guise
of a waiver or not-be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all Medicaid-eligible individuals. While the Doe decision is
binding only in the Eleventh Circuit, the ruling has persuasive

52 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999).

5 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
Id at 340.
55Id at 340-41 (citations omitted); see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496
U.S. 498, 509 (1990) (holding the Boren Amendment creates a federal right enforceable by health care providers under § 1983).
56 136 F.3d 709 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
57The Code of Massachusetts Regulations lists ICF/MR's under the heading
of "Alternatives to Institutional Care" and defines them as follows: "Community
intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (or for persons with related conditions) are small community-based residential programs for 15 or fewer residents."
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 130, § 433.482 (1994).
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value in other circuits and has become the foundation for much
of the subsequent waitlist litigation.
Waiting list lawsuits rely heavily upon the interconnectedness in Federal Medicaid law between institutional services
(i.e., services provided in a nursing home or ICF/MR) and
HCBS waiver services. Under federal law, a State may offer
HCBS waiver plans as an alternative to institutional care. 58 In
order to receive HCBS waiver services, an individual must be
found to have been eligible to receive institutional services.
When this equivalency criterion is satisfied, States are permitted
to offer HCBS waiver services in lieu of institutional services.
The covered individual is allowed to elect receipt of services in
the institutional setting or the community setting. 59
In subsequent HCBS waitlist litigation, plaintiffs have built
an argument based on the Doe framework and have alleged that
an individual's eligibility for institutional services should also
permit him or her to receive equivalent services via an HCBS
mechanism. Other arguments in waitlist lawsuits allege that
state-imposed limits on the availability of both institutional and
HCBS waiver services have caused otherwise eligible individuals to forego services for which they have been deemed eligible.60 In an argument crafted under § 1902(a)(10) of the Social
Security Act,6 1 plaintiffs have argued that the State has failed to
make available comparable long-term services for all Medicaideligible recipients, either by furnishing services to only a subset
of the population6 2 or by providing services only in the institutional setting
and not in the more inclusive community envi63
ronment.

Waiting list lawsuits have similarly challenged state practices with regard to the processing of Medicaid applications.
Some plaintiffs have alleged that States have effectively denied
disabled individuals the right to apply for Medicaid long-term
58

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (West Supp. 2001) (governing waiver programs).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (providing that "individuals who are
determined to be likely to require the level of care provided in a hospital, nursing
facility, or intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded are informed of the
feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the choice of such individuals,
to the provision of inpatient hospital services, nursing facility services, or services in
an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded").
60 See also infra Part ILB.3 (discussing access to benefits lawsuits).
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10).
62
See also infra Part ILB.3 (discussing access to benefits lawsuits).
59

63See also infraPart ILB.2 (discussing Olmstead lawsuits).
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services by not permitting formal applications for HCBS waiver
services and/or by not making prompt determinations with regard to such applications. 64 Plaintiffs assert that in delaying
Medicaid applications or agency decisions on such applications,
States are effectively violating § 1902(a)(3) of the Social Security Act by denying disabled individuals the right to appeal the
denial of Medicaid services. 65 In a similar vein, advocates are
arguing that application processing delays and denials of applications violate a disabled individual's 14th Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection rights under the U.S. Constitution.
2. "Olmstead Lawsuits"
So called "Olmstead Lawsuits" are based upon the integration mandate found in the United States Supreme Court's 1999
holding in Olmstead v. L.C.66 Generally speaking, the term
"Olmstead lawsuits" refers to litigation67 alleging that institutionalized individuals "have been improperly denied the opportunity to receive community services in the 'most integrated
setting.' 68 The Court ruled in Olmstead that unnecessary segregation of disabled individuals in institutional facilities constituted discrimination and thereby violated tlfe Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Olmstead's majority opinion, written
by Justice Ginsberg, concluded that the ADA requires a State to
deinstitutionalize disabled individuals, placing them in less restrictive community settings whenever: (a) treating professionals determine that a community placement is appropriate; (b)
the individual does not oppose the transfer from an institution to
the community; and (c) the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account factors such as the availability
69
of state resources and the needs of other disabled individuals.
Considerable overlap exists between Olmstead litigation,
waiting list litigation, and access to benefits litigation. Many
64See generally SMITH, supra note 12, § ElI.B (describing waiting list lawsuits).

65

la

6527
U.S. 581 (1999).
67
See generally SMITH, supra note 12, § IV (describing arguments and cases
falling into the "Olmstead lawsuits" category).
68 SMITH, supra note 12, § I; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2000) (providing
regulation that a "public entity shall administer services ... in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities"); Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 591-92 (describing the 'integration regulation').
6901nstead,527 U.S. at 587; SMITH, supra note 12, § IV.
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lawsuits allege that the delay in access to community services

and the insufficient number of community placements effectively restricts a disabled individual's ability to seek care in
anything other than a restrictive, institutional setting.
Figure 3: Olmstead Lawsuits as of March 200170
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Information adapted from SMIr, supranote 12, § IV.
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3. Access to Benefits Lawsuits
Access to benefits lawsuits allege that Medicaid recipients
have not been provided services or are unable to access services
that they are authorized to receive. 71 For example, an Arizona
case, Ball v. Biedess, 72 alleges that Medicaid payment rates for
community-based caregivers and professionals are inadequate to

enlist a sufficient number of community providers in order to
71 See

generally SMrrH, supra note 12, § V (describing arguments and cases

associated with the access to benefits category).
72 No. CIV 00-67 TUC ACM (D. Ariz. 2000).
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ensure that Medicaid services are locally available to all those
who are authorized to receive them.73 Similarly, the Ball case
alleges that a lack of sufficient service providers places disabled
individuals at risk of having to return to a more restrictive institutional environment to receive necessary care. 74 Sanchez v.
Johnson,75 a California case, argues that differential payment
and benefit structures for institutional versus community-based
providers have had the effect of subjecting MR/DD individuals
to unnecessary institutional placements76 and have encouraged
discrimination on the basis of disability.
Figure 4: Access to Benefits Lawsuits as of March
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7' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(30)(A) (West Supp. 2001) requires that payments be
"consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care."
74 See also supra Part TI.B.2 (discussing Olmstead lawsuits).
75

No. 00-CV-01 593 (CW) (N.D. Cal. 2000).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(30)(A) requires that methods and procedures for the
utilization of care and services be "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality
of care."
77 Information adapted from SMrrH, supra note 12, § V.B.
76
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State's payment rates.

PART IH: CASE STUDY: BOULET V. CELLUCCI
A. Introduction
In March 1999, private attorneys from the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts filed a class action lawsuit in federal district
court on behalf of six named plaintiffs78 and their families who

were dissatisfied with the pace at which the State was reducing
the waiting list for HCBS residential services. The plaintiffs'
proposed class definition included "all mentally retarded or developmentally disabled individuals in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts who are not receiving or have not received
Medicaid services for which they are eligible." 79 The plaintiffs'
complaint alleged that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had
violated Federal Medicaid law and the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to provide, with reasonable promptness,
Medicaid-funded residential services to otherwise eligible individuals and had instead indefinitely waitlisted those individuals
78 On May 25, 1999, lead plaintiff Valerie Anderson moved to dismiss her
claims without prejudice. Because of a deterioration of her health, she no longer requested that the Commonwealth immediately provide her with residential habilitation
services. Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 n.1 (D. Mass. 2000). This left
five named
plaintiffs.
79
Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Boulet (No.
99-10617-DPW); Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
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for approved services. To remedy violations of the Federal
Medicaid Act, the United States Constitution, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, plaintiffs sought permanent injunctive relief8° on behalf of approximately 3,000 mentally retarded and developmentally disabled individuals who had been
waitlisted for approved services by the Commonwealth. 8 '
B. Facts
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts participates in the
Federal Medicaid program and has committed to provide Medicaid services to both categorically needy and medically needy
populations. Pursuant to Federal Medicaid law,8 2 the Commonwealth's HCFA-approved Medicaid plan provides for eligible
individuals to receive services in an intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR). Similarly, the Commonwealth's plan provides for HCBS waiver services in lieu of
ICF/MR services as detailed in the Commonwealth's waiver
application to HCFA. The Federal Medicaid Act permits the
inclusion of such services under the auspices of a waiver provision:
The Secretary may by waiver provide that a state plan
approved under this subchapter may include as "medical
assistance" under such plan payment for part or all of
the cost of home or community-based services (other
than room and board) approved by the Secretary which
are provided pursuant to a written plan of care to individuals with respect to whom there has been a determination that but for the provision of such services the individuals would require the level of care provided in
a[n] . . .intermediate care facility for the mentally re-

tarded the cost of which could be reimbursed under the
83
State plan.

80 Mem. in Supp. of Pi's Mot. for Summ. J.at 1, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW). According to the plaintiffs' attorneys, "monetary damages [were] inadequate
to cure [the] harm, and [were] also unavailable by operation of the Eleventh Amendment." Id at 30.
' Id at 1.
82 42 U.S.C.A §§ 1396d(a)(15) (West Supp. 2001) (defining "medical assistance"), 1396d(d)(3) (defining ICF/MR care as an optional service that may be provided in a State Medicaid plan).
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(1).
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Under its waiver plan, Massachusetts provides for residential habilitation services, 84 day services and supports, supported

employment services, transportation, and respite care. 85 According to the waiver application, eligible individuals under the
waiver plan include developmentally disabled individuals under
the age of eighteen and mentally retarded individuals age eight-

een and older who also meet the financial qualifications for eli-

gibility (i.e., meet the definitions of categorical need).8 6
In accordance with federal requirements, individuals are

eligible to receive waiver services, if, but for the provision of
these services, they would require the level of care provided in
an ICF/MR,87 and provided that HCBS services can be provided
at the same or lesser cost than that which would have been incurred in an institutional setting, such as an ICF/MR or a nursing home. Massachusetts's waiver plan provides that when an
individual "'is determined to be likely to require' the level of

care provided by an ICF/MR," the individual shall be given the
option of receiving services in either an institutional setting or
in the community. 88 Finally, the Massachusetts waiver plan
guarantees individuals the opportunity for a fair hearing when
the choice of HCBS services instead of instithey are not given
89
tutional care.

84 Massachusetts's waiver plan defines "residential habilitation" as:
[A]ssistance with acquisition, retention, or improvement [of] skills related
to activities of daily living, such as personal grooming, and cleanliness,
bed making and household chores, eating and the preparation of food, and
the social and adaptive skills necessary to enable the individual to reside in
a non-institutional setting. Residential habilitation as used herein includes
services and supports that assist individuals with mental retardation to gain
independence and skills to live in the community, including in their natural/family home. .

.

. Residential habilitation also includes services and

supports to others which enable the individual with mental retardation to
remain living with the family in the natural/family home and to prevent institutionalization of the individual ....
Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65-66 (D. Mass. 2000) (quoting letter from
Mark E. Reynolds, Acting Commissioner, Executive Office of Health and Human
Services, to HCFA 12 (May 22,2000)).
85 Mem. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. at 4, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW).
861id

87 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
881id

89 Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. J. at 5, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW).
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In the Boulet lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged the Commonwealth failed to provide needed and approved Medicaid-funded
services to more than 3,00090 MR/DD individuals residing in

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Plaintiffs further alleged
that rather than provide necessary Medicaid-funded services,
the Commonwealth, through the Department of Mental Retardation (DMR), placed individuals on waiting lists for approved
services, frequently keeping an individual on the list for an extended period of time. Indeed, each of the original six named
plaintiffs in the Boulet lawsuit had been on DMR's waiting list
for at least three years at the time the lawsuit was filed, and
plaintiffs had been on the waiting list for more than
three of the
91
years.
ten
In fact, the Massachusetts DMR has 'maintain[ed] a waiting
list of individuals eligible for and in need of DMR services'
since at least 1988.92 At the end of fiscal year 1998, 3,014 individuals were on the Commonwealth's waiting list.93 Of those
listed, the 'vast majority' were 'in need of a residential service.' 94 In fiscal year 1998, for example, DMR reported that
72% of waitlisted individuals were waiting for residential services only and an additional 14% were waiting for residential
and day services.95 As District Judge Woodlock's opinion made
clear:
[T]he human side of this waiting list is far more compelling than any statistics can convey. Aging individuals
live with elder caregivers. Young individuals remain at
home after leaving special education. Families are in
90 According to figures released by the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Retardation (DMR) at the end of fiscal year 1998 (July), there were 3,014 unserved
individuals on DMR's waiting list. MASs. DEP'T OF MENTAL RETARDATION, OFFICE
OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, REPORT ON THE USE OF FuNDs FOR SERVICES TO
INDIvIDUALS ON THE DMR WAIT LST 2 (Jan. 1999), available at http'J/www.dmr.

state.ma.us/waithtm.
91 At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiffs Valerie Anderson, Edmund
Boulet, and Richard Byers had each been on the waiting list for more than ten years.
Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4-7, Boulet (No. 9910617-DPW). Plaintiffs Robert and Bryan Dubord had waited more than nine years
and five years, respectively, for Medicaid-funded services. Id at 7-8. Plaintiff Bridget
Studley had waited for Medicaid services for more than three years. Id at 8-9.
92
Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
93
d
94 id
95

Id
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crisis because they do not have the means or the natural
supports needed to care for their sons, daughters, sisters,
and brothers. Given the fact that mental retardation is a
life-long disability families are seeking services that
would create a secure future for their loved ones. Parents who have cared for their children since birth have
dedicated their own lives in order to enrich their children's lives. They have added their names to the DMR
96
waiting list, but their futures remain highly uncertain.
As DMR's own literature intimated, each of the named
plaintiffs on DMR's waiting list faced the real possibility that
her current caregiver would suddenly be unable to provide further support due to incapacity or death. Such an eventuality was
not improbable, as DMR itself had estimated that approximately
43% of individuals on the Commonwealth's waiting list had
caregivers over the age of sixty. 97 Furthermore, DMR noted that
"among that subset of older primary caregivers, more than half
of age, and approximately 16% are 80 years of
are over 70 years
98
older."
or
age
Having realized the precarious position of many families
with mentally retarded/developmentally disabled children
/siblings, the Boulet lawsuit was brought on behalf of "all mentally retarded or developmentally disabled individuals in Massachusetts who [were] not receiving Medicaid services for
which they [were] eligible." 99 The plaintiffs' attorneys waged a
classic "waitlist lawsuit" attack,10 0 arguing that as a participant
in the Federal Medicaid program and as a recipient of federal
funds, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was required to
comply with provisions in the Medicaid Act. Specifically, the
96 Id at 66-67 (alteration in original).
97 Mem. in Supp. of Pi's Mot. for Summ. J. at 9, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW).
98 Id

99 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
100 Indeed, in their May 6, 1999 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs allege that their action was "legally indistinguishable from a class action filed in Florida by developmentally disabled persons, in
which the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida officials violated section 1396a(a)(8) by
placing eligible individuals on a waiting list." Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ.
J. at 16, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW). The case to which these Massachusetts attorneys were referring was Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 712, 717 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's order requiring state officials to establish a 'reasonable waiting list time period, not to exceed ninety days'); see supra Part II.B.1.
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plaintiffs' attorneys pointed to the "reasonable promptness"' 0'
and "fair hearing"1° provisions in the Federal Medicaid Act,
which require a state agency to allow any individual whose
claim for medical assistance under the plan was denied or not
acted upon with reasonable promptness, to request an opportunity for a fair hearing. Predictably, in determining reasonable
promptness, the attorneys relied on federal regulations that govern the timeliness of agency response
to applications and re03
quests for Medicaid assistance.
In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs specifically requested
that the court require the defendants, "to offer all plaintiffs the
full range of ICF/MR services or home and community-based
waiver services and other services for which they are eligible
within 90 days or some other specifically-defined, reasonably
prompt period."' 1 4 The plaintiffs' attorneys argued that the
rights guaranteed by § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act were
enforceable in a § 1983 action. 10 5 Applying the elements of the
§ 1983 test established in Blessing v. Freestone,0 6 plaintiffs'
attorneys argued that Congress had intended the reasonable
promptness provision of the Medicaid Act to benefit the named
class of plaintiffs, that the rights outlined in the reasonable
promptness provision were "not so 'vague and amorphous' that
[their] enforcement would strain judicial competence," and that
the reasonable promptness provision unambiguously imposed
an obligation that was binding on the Commonwealth. 10 Furthermore, citing to Doe v. Chiles,10 8 the plaintiffs asserted that
the implementing regulations helped define the meaning of
"reasonable promptness ' 10 9 and directed that plaintiffs should
101Mer. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. at 13, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West Supp. 2001)).
102Mem. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J.at 13-14, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3)).
103See Mem. in Supp. of P1's Mot. for Summ. J. at 14-15, Boulet (No. 9910617-DPW) (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911,425.930(a) (2000)).
104Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21, Boulet
(No. 99-10617-DPW).
105Mem in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. L at 16-19, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW).
'06 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
107Mem. in Supp. of Pi's Mot. for Summ. J. at 16, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW).

103 136 F.3d 709 (1 1th Cir. 1998).

109
Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. I. at 17, Boulet (No. 99-10617DPW).
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not be forced to endure the "arbitrary and unpredictable lottery
for Medicaid services" 110 that was the Commonwealth's waiting
list, but should instead promptly receive services within the
home or community setting.
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted:
[T]he defendants' violation of section 1396a(a)(8) is not
excused by the fact that the various services at issue
here - ICF/MR care and waiver services - are optional

services that a participating state need not provide. Because the Commonwealth has committed to provide
these services as part of its Medicaid plan, it must come
promptness"
1
rrequireply with the statutory "reasonable
of those services.
provision
its
in
ment
C. District Court Ruling
1. Summary of Decision
In a July 14, 2000 decision, Judge Douglas P. Woodlock of
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts certified the plaintiffs' proposed class, but amended the
class definition so as to include only MR/DD adults in the State
who were eligible to receive Medicaid services under the cap
established in the Commonwealth's waiver proposal and who
were also currently on the Commonwealth's waiting list for
such services. Granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and finding that that the defendants had not met their
obligation under § 1396a(a)(8) to provide residential habilitation services with reasonable promptness, the court granted injunctive relief and ordered the defendants to provide services to
the plaintiffs within a ninety-day period. Leaving the door open,
Judge Woodlock permitted the defendants an opportunity to
show cause why the specified time period might be insufficient
to provide these services.

"0 Id at 23.
.' Id at 28.
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2. Enforceability of a § 1396a(a)(8) Claim Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
As a preliminary issue, Judge Woodlock determined, in accordance with several courts before him, that § 1396a(a)(8) provides a right that is enforceable under § 1983. Analyzing the
Boulet case under the framework established by Blessing v.
Freestone,112 Judge Woodlock explained that "in directing that
medical assistance 'shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals,' Congress clearly intended to
protect those eligible individuals from undue delays." 11 3 Pursuant to part one of the Blessing test, he found that 1"the
plaintiffs
14
[were] intended beneficiaries of the provision."
...
Judge Woodlock also found that part two of the Blessing
test was satisfied, relying on established First Circuit precedent:
A statute is not impermissibly vague simply because it
requires judicial inquiry into 'reasonableness.' . .
Rather, the relevant question is whether the action or
purpose whose 'reasonableness' is commanded has been
clearly delineated and is susceptible of judicial ascertainment." The fact that the state retains considerable
discretion in determining the time period in which the
medical services will be provided does not render the
requirement of "reasonable promptness" unenforceable.
"While there may be a range of reasonable [time periods
for provision of assistance], there certainly are some
[time periods] outside that range that no State could
ever find to be reasonable . . . under the [Medicaid]
Act. 115

Judge Woodlock concluded that "[c]ertain periods of time, like
the three to ten or more years plaintiffs have been waiting, are
'far outside the realm of reasonableness'-a
conclusion which a
11 6
court is perfectly capable of reaching."
2

520 U.S. 329 (1997).
13 Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 72 (D.Mass. 2000) (citation omit"

ted).

114 id

115
Id (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
116Id; But see Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347, 360-64 (1992) (finding a re-

quirement of "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal of children from their homes
and to facilitate reunification of families too vague for judicial enforcement).
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With regard to Blessing's third and final requirement,
Judge Woodlock found that the Medicaid statute unambiguously
imposed a binding obligation on the State and its agencies.
Judge Woodlock asserted that the requirement was mandatory,
rather than precatory, 117 and paralleled the 'federally imposed
obligation' found in statutory provisions of the Social Security
Act, which require States to provide Aid to Families with Dependent Children with reasonable promptness. 1 8 Regarding §
1396a(a)(8), he concluded, "[tihe mandatory language at issue
here unambiguously imposes an obligation upon Massachusetts
19
to furnish medical assistance 'with reasonable promptness.""
3. Defendants' Obligations Under Federal Medicaid Law
Having established that the plaintiffs had a right enforceable under § 1983, the court set out to rule upon the plaintiffs'
assertions that the defendants had shirked mandatory obligations promulgated under Federal Medicaid law. First the court
reiterated statutory underpinnings already addressed elsewhere
in this Note.12 0 Namely, the court upheld traditional statutory
analysis in holding that "once a state opts to implement a
waiver program and sets out eligibility requirements for that
program, eligible individuals are entitled to those services and
to the associated protections of the Medicaid Act."' 121 Citing to
the Eleventh Circuit Doe decision, Judge Woodlock opined that
"when a state chooses to provide an optional service, the service
'becomes a part of the state Medicaid plan and is therefore subject to the requirements of federal law. ' , 122 Also pertinent was
do
the Doe court ruling that "'[i]nadequate state appropriations
123
not excuse noncompliance' with the Medicaid Act."'
The freedom of choice provision states:
[I]ndividuals who are determined to be likely to require
the level of care provided in a[n] . . . intermediate care

facility for the mentally retarded are informed of the
"7 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
118 I'L

119Id
2

See supra Part ILB.1.

121Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
' 22 Id at 77.
123 Id. (alternation in original) (citing Doe v. Chiles 136 F.3d 709, 722 (11

Cir. 1998) (quoting Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 396 (5th
Cir. 1980))).
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feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the
choice of such individuals, to the provision of.

.

. ser-

vices in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded' 24
This provision is clarified by its associated regulation,
which provide that recipients must be "[i]nformed of any feasible alternatives available under the waiver" and "[g]iven the
choice of either institutional or home and community-based services. 125 Clearly, this "freedom of choice provision creates
binding obligations on any State that elects to provide supports
and services in homes pursuant to the Home and CommunityBased Waiver."' 126 Indeed, "neither the hope of a future place-

ment after years on a waiting list nor an option which may not
meet an individual's needs constitutes a meaningful choice as
contemplated by § 1396n(c)(2). '

,27

4. Impact of the Cap
How the cap on waiver services affects a mentally retarded/developmentally disabled individual's ability to access
services for which he is eligible is confounding. Judge Woodlock stated that "[t]he cap on waiver services is simply a constraint on eligibility."'128 He noted that, "on a theoretical level, a
cap may be problematic":
[W]hile all eligible individuals are entitled to waiver
services, the statutory scheme allows a cap which may
prevent some of those eligible individuals from receiving the services they request. This theoretical construct
treats a cap as something distinct from the eligibility requirements. As a practical matter, the statute can best be
read to mandate that, once a state chooses to implement
a waiver program and chooses the eligibility requirements, a cap is simply another eligibility requirement
for that program. .

.

. Individuals who apply after the

cap has been reached are not eligible, or alternatively,

124 42

U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2001).

125 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
12

Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

'27 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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the waiver services are not "feasible" for them until the
cap has risen to include them. 129
Judge Woodlock therefore concluded that all of "the eligible
individuals under the cap are entitled to waiver services."' 3 Accordingly, because the state plan provides for ICF/MR services
under the waiver (as well as for other approved waiver services)
13
individuals under the cap are entitled to such services. '
The Commonwealth failed, in Judge Woodlock's estimation, to provide in a reasonably prompt fashion the twenty-four
hour community-based residential services that plaintiffs had
requested and for which they were deemed to be eligible. "[T]he
assistance must correspond to the individual's needs, and . . .
the state has recognized that those individuals on the waiting
list, and the named plaintiffs in particular, need the services for
which they are waiting."1 32 Accordingly, the provision of alternative services that did not rise to the level of requested or
needed services was simply insufficient. Furthermore, any
choice between institutional and home or communitybased services sanctioned in § 1396n(c)(2)(C) would be
rendered essentially meaningless if states which had implemented a waiver program could escape the promptness requirement and other requirements that would
force them to make the waiver services available simply
by providing some other
services or some other choice
133
to eligible individuals.
5. Feasibility of State-Generated Waiting Lists
Having determined that the reasonable promptness provision applied to all of the services sought by the plaintiffs, and
that the provision of alternate services did not satisfy Federal
Medicaid requirements, Judge Woodlock then turned to the viability of state-generated waiting lists, holding that "a determination that the waiting list violates the 'reasonable promptness'
requirement if settings are available for the services plaintiffs

129 Id.
130lid
'31 Id

at 78.

132 Id at 79.
1331d
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request follows ineluctably." 134 Judge Woodlock relied, in part,
on the United States Supreme Court decision concerning a parallel provision that governed distributions under Aid to Families
with Dependent Children:
That section was enacted at a time when persons whom
the State had determined to be eligible for the payment
of benefits were placed on waiting lists, because of the
shortage of state funds. The statute was intended to prevent the States from denying benefits, even temporarily,
to a3 5erson who has been found fully qualified for

aid.

Citing to Sobky v. Smoley, Judge Woodlock similarly relied
on Judge Levi's interpretation of this statement as applied to
Medicaid law, who had held "[i]t follows from Jefferson that
the Medicaid Act's reasonable promptness requirement, set
forth at § 1396a(a)(8), prohibits states from responding to budgetary constraints in such a way as to cause otherwise eligible
recipients to be placed on waiting lists for treatment." 136 Noting
that some plaintiffs had been waiting for requested services for
more than a decade, Judge Woodlock concluded that "defenif
dants have not been reasonably prompt [in providing services] 137
facilities are available for offering the requested services."

The pfactice of placing individuals on a waitlist for necessary
services violated the intent of the Medicaid statute and its reasonable promptness requirement.
6. Remedy
Judge Woodlock granted the plaintiffs' requested relief by
mandating the defendants provide Medicaid-funded services to
eligible individuals in a specifically defined, prompt time frame.
The judge adopted the ninety-day proposal propounded by the
plaintiffs, stating that "Massachusetts should be able to respond
to each new request for plan or waiver services by providing
those services within 90 days if the applicant is eligible, the
services are feasible, and settings are available for the delivery

134 id.

135
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972).
136 Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
137
Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
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of these services." 138 In making the ninety-day requirement
conditional upon the availability of resources, Judge Woodlock
left the door open for the defendants to argue that facilities were
not available to provide requested services. Indeed, Judge
Woodlock stated that "[t]he rulings in this case cannot create
new settings but they can and are intended to encourage vendors
to be willing to provide both the settings and the services to
meet the promise of the Massachusetts waiver plan by assuring
reimbursement up to the waiver cap." 139 In light of deficiencies
in the record with regard to the availability of services, particularly in group home settings as requested by the plaintiffs, the
judge afforded the defendants an opportunity to "show cause..
. why 90 days [was] not a feasible timetable" for the transitional
order. 140

D. "Show Cause" Dispute
Defendants did, in fact, submit a memorandum in response
to the court's order to show cause. Plaintiffs' attorneys characterized the defendants' submission as asking the court to "give
them open-ended discretion to maintain a waiting list indefinitely."'1 ' In a very substantial reply, plaintiffs insisted that "[a]
specific, concrete transitional order [was] absolutely necessary"'142 and went on to propose a detailed transitional order
with respect to residential habilitation services. Specifically,
plaintiffs requested that the court enter an order requiring the
defendants, on a transitional basis and within the proposed
ninety-day period, to take several specific steps to make these
services available:
1. allocate funding for residential habilitation services;
2. issue [Requests for Responses] and initiate other
measures for program development;

131 l at 82.
3
1 9 id

140id

141
P1's Reply to Def.'s Mem. in Resp. to the Ct.'s Order to Show Cause at 1,
Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
142
Id
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3. conduct planning meetings with all members of the
plaintiff class to identify an appropriate program model
for each plaintiff; and
4. provide interim services and supports until the plainthe requested residential habilitatiff actually receives
143
tion services.
Plaintiffs similarly requested that the court order periodic
progress reports from defendants. 44
E. Settlement Agreement
On December 19, 2000, the parties involved in the Boulet
litigation reached a settlement agreement.145 Approved by Judge
Woodlock, the agreement provides for a total of $114 million in
additional funding 146 over the course of the next five years: essentially, $85 million in new money and $29 million in base
funds (i.e., money already in DMR's budget) were appropriated. 147 The settlement agreement provides services for all
plaintiffs, meaning each of the five remaining individually
named plaintiffs and all individuals with MR/DD who were on
the DMR waiting list as of July 14, 2000. As part of the settlement agreement, the parties submitted an Assented-to Motion to
Modify the Plaintiff Class Definition, revising the definition
established by the district court judge in his July 14, 2000 ruling. Where Judge Woodlock's definition of the plaintiff class
included 'all mentally retarded or developmentally disabled
adults in Massachusetts who are eligible to receive Medicaid
services under the plan's cap and who are currently on a waiting
list for such services,' plaintiffs' revised definition specified all
of the 2,437 persons who were on the DMR waiting list as of
July 14, 2000.148

143 Id. at3.
144 Id

145 Settlement Agreement, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
146 This additional funding is annualized. This means that once the funding
has been added to the state budget, it remains as an annual item in years to come.
Thus, over the course of a decade, for example, the funding will be worth close to $1
billion.
147 Settlement Agreement at 4-7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
'48 Id at 2 n.1.
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Pursuant to the settlement agreement, beginning in fiscal
year 2002 and extending through fiscal year 2006, the "Defendants agree[d] to request additional appropriations for the Department of Mental Retardation (DMR) in a total amount of $85
million . . . to provide, purchase, or arrange for 1,250 new,

state-funded out-of-home placements and Interim Services for
the Plaintiffs."' 149 Additional appropriations were to be structured in the following manner:
Figure 5: Additional (New) Appropriations Under the
Settlement Agreement' 5°
Fiscal Year
Appropriations Amount
2002
$22 million
2003
$18 million
2004
$15 million
2005
$15 million
2006
$15 million
Total
$85 million
51
According to the settlement agreement, the Governor'
must request the additional appropriations for each fiscal
year. 152 If, for any given year, the legislature fails to designate
the entire amount of the additional appropriation, that outstanding sum will be cumulatively added to the amount to be
requested in the following year. 53 Pursuant to the agreement,
the Governor's obligation to request additional appropriations
will not extend beyond fiscal year 2007.154
DMR, for its part, committed to use the funds appropriated
by the Massachusetts Legislature in a manner consistent with
the terms of the appropriations by agreeing to "provide, purchase, or arrange for 1,250 new state-funded out-of-home placements"' 155 according to the following schedule:

149/ J

at 5.
150 Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 6-7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
151 Massachusetts's current governor is Jane Swift.
152 Settlement Agreement at 6, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
153 id
54

iam
155 Id. "State-funded out-of-home placement" is defined as "group homes
or

staffed apartments in the community, and family partnerships in the community." Id.
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Figure 6: New Residential
Placements Under the Set156
Agreement
tlement
Fiscal
Out-of-Home Placements Funding Allocated
Year
Based on New Funding
2002
250
$17 million
2003
275
$18.7 million
2004
250
$17 million
2005
250
$17 million
2006
225
$15.3 million
Total
1,250
$85 million
DMR likewise agreed to use $29 million in funds already
appropriated for use by the Massachusetts Legislature (i.e.,
"base funds") in a manner consistent with appropriations, committing to provide 675 out-of-home placements in existing
group homes, 157 staffed apartments, 158 shared living arrangements, 1 59 adult foster care with DMR support, 160 or family partnerships. 61 Specifically, DMR committed to provide out-ofhome placements as follows:

at 3. The definition does not include adult foster care or shared living arrangements,
nor does it include ICF/MR facilities.
156 Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 6-7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
157"Group Home" is defined as "a residence operated by DMR or by a private
provider under contract with DMR that has two or more residents who are DMR
consumers and that provides services and supports for each resident." Id. at 4.
1'8
"Staffed Apartment" is defined as "a community-based apartment operated
by a private provider under contract with DMR that has one or more residents who
are DMR consumers and that provide services and supports for each resident." Id.
159 "Shared Living Arrangement" is defined as "an arrangement where a private provider under contract with DMR arranges for a DMR consumer to live in the
home of a family or individual that provides services and supports to the DMR consumer." Id.
160
"Adult Foster Care with DMR Supports" is defined as "the Medicaid State
plan service known as Adult Foster Care in which DMR funds are paid to supplement
program activities and expenditures." Icl
161 "Family Partnership" is defined as "a cooperative arrangement in which
a
DMR consumer or his or her family provides or contributes toward the cost of a residence in which DMR provides or arranges for services." Id

224
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Figure 7: Residential Placements Based
162 on Existing
Funds Under the Settlement Agreement
Fiscal
Out-of-Home Placements Funding Allocated
Year
Based on Existing Money
2002
125
$5,370,370
2003
125
$5,370,370
2004
125
$5,370,370
2005

150

$6,444,444

2006
Total

150
675

$6,444,444
$29 million

In addition to the new 1,250 out-of-home placements based
on new appropriations 163 and the 675 out-of-home placements to
be provided based on existing monies, 164 DMR agreed to "provide, purchase, or arrange out-of-home placements for 300
Plaintiffs in Fiscal Year 2001 using funds already appropriated
by the Massachusetts Legislature for this purpose in Fiscal Year
2001 .,,165 Furthermore,
[i]f a total of fewer than 2,225 Plaintiffs receive out-ofhome placements during the Term of this Agreement,
then DMR shall provide, purchase or arrange for the
remainder of the 2,225 out-of-home placements that
DMR has agreed to provide, purchase or arrange pursuant to this Agreement to persons who were not on the
DMR Waiting List as of July 14, 2000.166
In addition to the provision of out-of-home/residential services over the course of the next five years, the settlement
agreement also provides for the funding of interim services required for qualified individuals as they await placement in an
out-of-home setting. The Settlement Agreement mandates that
[b]eginning in Fiscal Year 2002... DMR will provide,
purchase or arrange for all of the Interim Services which
DMR determines that each individual Plaintiff needs
' 62 Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
'

63

See supra fig.6.

164
See supra fig.7.
165
Settlement Agreement at 9, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
166md
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while he or she waits for an out-of-home placement;
provided, however, that for each fiscal year covered by
the term of this Agreement, DMR shall not be obligated
to spend more money than appropriated [by the Massachusetts Legislature at the behest of the Governor].
DMR will provide, purchase, or arrange for Interim Services for each Plaintiff, as needed, until such time as the
individual
Plaintiff moves into an out-of-home place67
ment. 1
The timeline and fiscal allocation for the provision of interim
services is as follows:
Figure 8: Interim Services Under
168
Agreement
Fiscal # of Individuals Receiving
Year
Interim Services
2002
1,550
2003
1,150
2004
775
2005
375
2006
0

the Settlement

Total

$11,190,000

New Funding Allocated
$5,000,000
$4,300,000
$2,300,000
$300,000
$0

Approved by Judge Woodlock on January 29, 2001, the settlement agreement affords choice and predictability to MR/DD
individuals, provides a mechanism for pursuing residential
placement, develops a timeline for staff training, allows for
formal notice to individuals in need of services, provides for
formal rights of appeal and judicial review of care determinations, and mandates quarterly progress reports' 69 from the
'67Id

at 8-9.

'(' Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 6 app.A, Boulet (No. 99-10617-

DPW).
169 The Settlement Agreement mandates that
DMR shall submit reports to Class Counsel describing its activities under
this Agreement beginning on February 15, 2001 and continuing in threemonth intervals thereafter, on the fifteenth day of each third month,
through the term of this Agreement... DMR will also conduct meetings
every six months with Class Counsel for the purpose of informing Class
Counsel about the progress of its compliance with this Agreement.
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State. 70 Advocates lauded the outcome as "provid[ing] a positive outcome to a legal battle that began in March 1999.,,17

PART IV: APPROACHES TO SECURING
MEDICAID SERVICES
How positive was the outcome of the Boulet litigation?
Clearly, the plaintiffs saw significant gain in that more than
2,000 previously waitlisted individuals would receive desired
and necessary residential services within a five-year time frame.
But, what costs were attendant to this gain? What concerns
arose from the Boulet decision and settlement agreement? What
tools, other than litigation, might have either improved the Boulet outcome or enhanced the process and ultimate success of
these plaintiffs?
This first half of this section will discuss some of the specific issues that commonly arise in the creation of HCBS waivers. The second half will look to mitigating steps-some of
which were employed in the Boulet case-that can be taken to
improve outcomes for individuals and advocates that seek
Medicaid-funded HCBS waiver services for MR/DD individuals.
A. Some Issues Arising from the Creation of HCBS Waiver
Programs
1. Quality of Life and Quality of Care
Quality of life and quality of care are two distinct issues
that are not always compatible. 172 "[Q]uality of life addresses
the degree to which individuals are satisfied with their lives,
[whereas] quality of care refers to the degree to which the appropriate care that is given will improve or maintain the individual's level of functioning."'' 73 Not only are these two concepts distinct, they can potentially be in conflict. For example,
factors that presumably promote quality of care, such as strict
care delivery regulations and protocols, can actually decrease an
ld. at 16.
170Planning and Action Begin on Heels of Waiting List Settlement, ARC
MAss. ADvoc. (Arc Massachusetts, Waltham, Mass.), Spring 2001, at 1, 5.
"7' Id at
1.
172 LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 25.
73

1

id
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individual's quality of life by allowing less personal freedom or
individual autonomy. 174 Conversely, deficits in quality of care
can exacerbate and further diminish an individual's quality of
life; poor quality of care can lead to diminished quality of life
as evidenced by increased morbidity or premature mortality.175
Herein lies the struggle that dominates the provision of Medicaid-funded services-how do you provide care in the "least
restrictive setting," striving to promote autonomy, freedom, and
quality of life while still assuring quality of care, sufficiency in
the monitoring of care plans, and adequacy of staff training?
Some state administrators fear that equilibrium has not yet
been achieved in the HCBS care environment: the autonomous
home-care setting, while preferable to an institutional setting,
does not promote the active monitoring and assessment that presumably is more readily achieved in a large-scale care environment. 176 Indeed, the holding in Olmstead mandated that the integrated, community-based setting that was least restrictive was
also the most preferable, but in avoiding the imposing regulations found in institutional
settings, guarantees of quality care
77
may be sacrificed. 1
Lutzky and colleagues, in a report prepared for HCFA, reviewed nationwide program literature and data related to Medicaid § 1915(c) HCBS waiver programs.1 78 They concluded that
concerns about quality of care could be grouped into the following three categories: difficulty in monitoring noninstitutional
care, inexperience in monitoring noninstitutional care, and impact of low provider reimbursement rates on quality of care. 179
a. Difficulty in Monitoring Noninstitutional Care
According to Lutzky's 2000 report, it is more difficult to
monitor the quality of care provided in group homes or smaller
residential settings than it is to monitor care in large institutions
174 id.

175 Id.
76

1 As stated earlier in Part ILA, and as was evidenced in the lawsuits of the
1970's and 1980's, large-scale/institutional environments do not necessarily support
quality of care. Instead, reality has shown that monitoring of care provisions in institutional settings were not widely successful.
1778 See LurZKY Er AL., supra note 8, at 4, 25.
17 LTZKy FT AL., supra note 8. It is important to note that this is a review of
HCBS waiver programs across the country and does not specifically or individually
address elements
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's § 1915(c) waiver plan.
79
1 Id. at 25-26.
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because smaller settings receive less "public traffic" and clients/participants are more "dispersed." 18 The number of smaller
licensed residential settings serving people with MR/DD has
grown dramatically; while there were 14,700 such settings in
1982, the number grew to 104,800 in 1998.181 Currently,
MR/DD waiver programs "serve approximately twice as many
recipients as [do] institutions."'1 82 Reports by county auditors
not infrequently found gross deficiencies in the quality of care,
resulting in recommendations for "improved screening for new
adult foster home operators, enhanced monitoring, more consiswith cititent imposition of sanctions, and greater coordination
'1 83
zens and professionals to identify problem homes."
b. Inexperience in Monitoring Noninstitutional Care
Lutzky and colleagues similarly point to individual States'
inexperience at monitoring quality in the home and community
settings. According to these authors, "states have not established regulations or licensing requirements for certain types of
residential alternatives."1' 84 Lutzky and colleagues assert that
homes and settings that are not equipped to serve as skilled
nursing facilities are increasingly taking on more responsibilities and more complex patients/clients and yet are still subject
to minimal regulation, potentially resulting in diminishing returns 5 in terms of the quality of services provided to consum18
ers.
To protect against such inexperience, plaintiffs' counsel is
to play an active role in monitoring the implementation of the
settlement agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs' counsel will review information on the numbers of people who will receive
services pursuant to the settlement agreement and has plans to
contact individual plaintiffs to ensure that their needs are being
met. Thus, the plaintiffs 186
need not rely on state monitoring of the
process.
implementation
'go Id at 25.
181Id at 26 (citation omitted).
"2 Id at 29.
'8' Id at 26.
184 I
185 id

186Email from David Friedman, Counsel for Boulet Plaintiffs, Hill & Barlow,
to Margaret K. Feltz, Associate Attorney, McDermott, Will & Emery (Oct. 23, 2001)
(on file with author).
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c. Impact of Low Provider Reimbursement Rates on Quality of
Care
Finally, Lutzky and colleagues warn that "[s]tates may see
the reduction of rates paid to providers as an easy mechanism
for controlling costs; and community-based care organizations
may lack the organizational structure and lobbying power to
fight rate reductions possessed by the nursing facility industry."187 Quoting a provider association representative from Oregon, Lutzky summarized the negative impact of low provider
reimbursement rates on quality of care, stating that it seems that88
the State is 'balancing its budget on the backs of providers."
Challenges surrounding provider reimbursement in the home
and community settings have recently moved to the courtroom,
with plaintiffs arguing that disparate benefit and salary structures in the institutional versus HCBS markets are forcing disabled individuals to live in more restrictive institutional settings
(a potential Olmstead violation) and are violating the ADA by
discriminating on the basis of disability. 189 The impact of provider reimbursement rates on quality of care (and, potentially,
quality of life) simply cannot be underestimated.
Measuring the quality of care also presents challenges, for
mechanisms normally used in the acute care realm do not readily translate to the long-term care environment. The fact that
goals in the long-term care environment are not always clearly
defined and often vary between the different parties involved
(i.e., administrators, providers, clients, families) further complicates the situation. 19 Similarly, the fact that the condition of
many individuals in long-term care does not improve despite
oftentimes 191intensive treatment further complicates these assessments.
187 LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 26.
188 Id. (quoting L.M.B.

ALECXIH ET AL., ESTIMATED CosT SAVINGS FROM THE

USE OF HoME AND COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO NuRSING FACILITY CARE IN
THREE STATES (1996)).

'8I See Interveners' Am. Compl., Ball v. Biedess, No. CIV 00-67 TUC ACM
(D. Ariz. 2000) (describing plaintiffs' allegations that they were denied HCBS services because the provider claimed they were unable to find sufficient workers at
their wage levels); Compl., Sanchez v. Johnson, No. 00-CV-01 593 (CW) (N.D. Cal.
2000) (challenging the HCBS provider's criteria and methods of administration and
payment); Supra Part IILB.3.
190 LuTZKy ET AL., supra note 8, at 26.
191Id.
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2. Monitoring Mechanisms
Efforts to ensure quality of care include licensing, certification, and regulatory requirements for providers and care sites as
well as monitoring of care activities. 192 Because service providers in many waiver programs are unskilled, these sites do not
have the built-in quality controls that are often found in skilled
193
nursing facilities, ICF/MR's, and other institutional settings.
Much of the monitoring in the HCBS environments is programmatic monitoring, rather than provider monitoring, resulting in what Lutzky and colleagues refer to as a regulatory 'hole'
left with regard to unskilled long-term care workers. 194 States
typically have relied on traditional monitoring practices such as
credential checks and records reviews, on-site inspections, unannounced inspections, and "public" sanctions, which have provided incentives for improvements in quality of care.195 With
community-based care provisions, however, these monitoring
mechanisms come at a significant financial cost because care
196
sites are so dispersed. With 240 individual waiver programs,
each with a multitude of care sites, on-site monitoring presents
significant logistical challenges.
Case management and care management have been another
means of monitoring the quality of care provided. When case
managers maintain regular contact with clients and service providers, they can provide valuable input to a patient's quality of
care. Large caseloads have impeded this monitoring mechanism,
as have the lack of unified procedures
to address problems that
97
are identified by a case manager. 1
Relying on client input as a means of monitoring quality
care has both benefits and drawbacks. Some States have established hotlines or ombudsman programs to address consumer
complaints regarding HCBS providers. 198 As Lutzky and col192 Id at 27.
193 id

194Id. at 28 (citing PROGRAM EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY Div., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-94-19, LONG-TERM CARE: STATUS OF QUAL-

tbl.3
(1994); Elanor D. Kinney et al., Quality Improvement in Community-Based, LongTerm Care:
Theory and Reality, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 60, 63 (1994)).
195 id
196 HCBS, supra note 9, 8.

ITY ASSURANCE AND MEASUREMENT IN HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES

197 LurzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 28.
198 I'
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leagues point out, however, it is important to realize the very
real limitations that exist in soliciting client complaints as a
means of monitoring program quality. Lutzky warns that "the
most vulnerable populations, such as those with cognitive impairments and those who lack adequate informal support, are
unlikely to complain through formal channels. Consumers may
also be reluctant to file a complaint against a service provider
99
out of fear of losing services that are essential to them.'
3. Cost Control Mechanisms
HCFA and the individual States have been cautious about
the expansion of HCBS waiver programs. In part, this is a result
of fears that individuals would 'come out of the woodwork'
looking for Medicaid-funded HCBS services.200 State control
mechanisms in the HCBS realm include a limit on program appropriations in state budgets, caps on the spending per recipient
under a waiver plan, or caps on the number of individuals
served under the waiver. 20 1 Other mechanisms employed to help
control or limit costs include: capitalizing on funds from other
sources to make waiver funds go further, case management,
prior authorization requirements, nurse delegation (i.e., the employment of non-licensed caregivers to perform certain medical
services, thereby making the provision of services less costly,
but also potentially compromising quality of care), estate recovery plans, information tracking to monitor costs and recovery
claims, and utilizing alternate residential care environments,
such as apartment communities, that operate under economy of
scale principles.20 2
4. Segregation of the MR/DD Population into Classes
Another real concern that arises as the result of the initiation of
class action Medicaid litigation to achieve gains for the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled has been the creation of distinct classes or groups represented by particular lawsuits. In bringing the Boulet lawsuit-or any similar lawsuitdid the plaintiffs and their attorneys simply succeed in creating
'99 Id
2

at 29.

KuLKARNI, supranote 28, § I; PERKINS & KULKARNI, supranote 30, at 1.
201 LTzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 29-30; see supra Part BII (discussing examples of caps within the Boulet litigation).
202
LurzKY Er AL., supra note 8, at 30-31.
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a class that excluded other MR/DD individuals who were also in
need of Medicaid-funded health care services?20 3 Concerns over
evenhandedness, "line jumping," and the creation of a void as a

result of class action litigation can be realities. 204 Does class
action Medicaid litigation ultimately create a vacuum that
leaves some vulnerable and deserving populations without services? Does one lawsuit produce the domino effect, forcing subsequent litigation, as that is the only way for distinct populations of MR/DD individuals to find a voice to advocate for their

medical needs ?205

B. Recommended Approach to Securing Medicaid-Funded
Services for the Mentally Retarded/Developmentally Disabled
A recent article discussing the Olmstead decision that appeared in the Journal of Poverty Law and Policy recommended
that before initiating litigation under Olmstead, "advocates
[should] focus on policy advocacy for remedying unnecessary

institutionalization of individuals with disabilities.,

20 6

The au-

thors, Ira Burnim and Jennifer Mathis of the Judge David L.

Bazelton Center for Mental Health Law in Washington, D.C.,
based their recommendation on an assessment that "the time is
ripe for political activity in this area." 20 7 While their recommen-

dations applied specifically to litigation involving Olmstead's
ADA integration mandate, valuable lessons can be drawn from
their advice.

Burnim and Mathis advise that advocates should urge
States to expand the provision of services in small community
residential programs; advocate that States expand HCBS and

demonstration waiver programs; and encourage States to maxi203 Telephone conversation with Gail Grossman, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation (Mar. 2001); see also Ira
Burnim & Jennifer Mathis, After Olmstead v. L.C.: Enforcing the Integration Mandate of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: J. POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 633 (2000) (recommending that advocates should use the Olmstead decision
as a policy tool, but also reviewing litigation elements).
204 See Burnim & Mathis supra note 203, at 646 (discussing evenhandedness
in the context of the Olmstead litigation).
205 Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that their "experience in Boulet has been very
positive-our settlement agreement results in additional funding for services, above
and beyond the funding that would have been dedicated to the Department of Mental
Retardation." Email from David Friedman, supra note 186.
206 Burnim & Mathis supra note 203, at 636.
271
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mize the use of federal block grant money, federal housing assistance programs, federal disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, state general fund appropriations for mental disability services, and resources created
by downsizing existing state-run institutions. 2 Similarly, they
state that "[a]dvocates should insist on being involved in formulating and implementing any plan for remedying needless institutionalization." 20 9 In securing a plan, these authors recommend
that advocates work through coalitions of disability advocates,
for the "[a]dvocates' approach to policy advocacy, as well as its
success, will depend on advocates' strength and their relationships with the state. 210 Generally speaking, only after advocacy
efforts are exhausted do these authors suggest turning to litigation as a means of obtaining desired outcomes on behalf of the
population with MR/DD.
In all cases-either in Olmstead litigation or in other Medicaid litigation meant to secure resources and services for the
mentally retarded and developmentally disabled-cooperative
participation of advocates, consumers, state officials, and other
interested parties is the best approach and almost certainly "the
best course

. . .

will be to wait rather than rush to the court-

house. 211 In the end, "[e]ven if little or nothing comes of the
state's efforts, [to cooperatively address the needs of individuals
with MR/DD,] advocates will be in a much better position to
litigate later" for "[t]hey will have educated themselves through
involvement in the state's planning and can avoid the political
costs of being
perceived as having 'sued first and asked ques' 212
tions later.

,

At the same time, however, Burnim and Mathis suggest that
advocates should be wary of what they call a State's 'obfuscate
and delay' approach, which may result in long timelines and
nonexistent state efforts to address the needs of these vulnerable
populations.213 While the adage "timing is everything" might be
invoked to suggest a cautionary "wait and see" approach, there
is also something to be said for "striking while the iron is hot."
Use of genuine threats of litigation, or the actual initiation of
203id
209 id
210 Id
211Id at 637.
212
213

Id
Id

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 12:181

litigation itself, are sometimes enough to prompt a State to address the needs of disabled individuals.
The approach in the Boulet case adopted many of the tactics suggested by Burnim and Mathis and was further enhanced
by taking special account of some of the more problematic
characteristics of HCBS waiver programs. While the district
court opinion does not indicate that the suggested "wait and
see" approach was adopted, litigation may have been the most
effective means of terminating a potential "obfuscate and delay"
tactic contemplated by the Commonwealth. 1 4 By engaging in
litigation, the plaintiffs' attorneys in Boulet addressed what can
only be described as a very real problem with the State's waiting list for residential habilitation services. In bringing a class
action lawsuit, they succeeded in securing Medicaid-funded outof-home services for more than 2,000 individuals. Using litigation as a tool to effectively produce change, the plaintiffs' attorneys also avoided some of the potential pitfalls of Medicaid
lawsuits through the use of creative negotiating and drafting
during the settlement phase of the case.
Litigation, in this. case, provided the impetus for change.
While the relationship between the defendants and the plaintiffs
in this case was, at times, tenuous and seemingly adversarial,
together, the two parties successfully achieved a sound result in
concluding settlement negotiations. By advocating aggressively
on behalf of the class, plaintiffs' attorneys were able to secure
several key points in settlement. Plaintiffs were able to earmark
some $29 million in base funds toward the provision of residential services on behalf of their clients and were similarly successful in securing an additional $85 million in new appropriations for use in the same purpose. They secured interim services
on behalf of their clients and, with the agreement and cooperation of defense counsel, structured a realistic timeline for the
214

Undeniably, a waiting period of three to ten years is simply too long to

expect an individual to wait for necessary services to which they are entitled. It is
important to note that at least part of this delay was outside of the control of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation. As Judge Woodlock wrote:
This passage illustrates an irony presented by this lawsuit. In this and other
reports, DMR has shown a clear concern for individuals on its waiting list
and a desire to address the problem that the list presents. In large part, the
waiting list appears to be the result of resource allocation choices outside
of DMR's control, and DMR has urged legislative action to correct the
situation.
Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2000).
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rectification of the waitlist dilemma. Built into the settlement
agreement were some monitoring mechanisms (i.e., quarterly
reports, biannual meetings, etc.) and an "escape clause" permitting a return to litigation channels if the settlement agreement is
not followed.
Other goals, such as the active involvement of clients and
families in the creation of sufficient care plans and the fair and
competitive pay of providers, could not be achieved through the
Boulet litigation. Success on these fronts might depend on advocacy efforts and lobbying efforts, regulation of the HCBS setting or legislation to standardize care provision. This combined
approach, which has its roots in litigation, but draws significantly upon legislative, regulatory, and advocacy components,
will ultimately produce the best result in the current Medicaid
litigation environment.
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POST SCRIPT
On November 21, 2001, almost five months after its July 1,
2001 due date, the Massachusetts legislature passed its fiscal
year 2002 budget of $22.6 billion, which resulted in cuts of
$650 million. 215 These drastic cuts, an attempt to help meet a
$1.4 billion budget deficit, 21 6 were dubbed the 'Thanksgiving
and advocacy groups who rallied
massacre' by several lobbyists
217
cuts.
budget
the
to reverse
Among the hardest hit by the budget cuts was the Department of Mental Retardation, which suffered deletion of $22 million worth of annualized funding 218 mandated under the Boulet
settlement agreement. Gerald Morrissey, Commissioner of the
Department of Mental Retardation assessed the bleak situation
following the elimination of settlement funds:
The Department has already committed approximately
$9.8 million of this appropriation to cover approximately one-third of the new placements as well as all of
the interim family support services, and does not have
$9.8 million elsewhere in the budget. Eighty-four individuals who have already been placed in FY02 would
likely have the residential services provided under the
agreement taken away, requiring them in most instances
to return home.219
Addressing the elimination of settlement funds, Leo V.
Sarkissian, Executive Director of the Association of Retarded
Citizens of Massachusetts simply said, '[t]here's no way to
make this painless. Reversal must be pursued.' 220 Plaintiffs' attorney Neil McKittrick promised a return to litigation if funding
was not restored: "'To say the least, it's a little frustrating'....
215 Rick Klein, Deal Would Restore Some Budget Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.

13, 2001, at B4 [hereinafter Budget Cuts].
216 Rick Klein, Lawmakers OK $22.6B Budget at the Wire, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 22, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Budget at the Wire].
217 Rick Klein, Advocates Looking to Neutralize 'Massacre' Groups Rally to
Restore Elderly, DMR Funding, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 2001, at B1 [hereinafter
DMR Funding].

218 Eileen McNamara, Defenseless to Fight Back BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28,

2001, at B 1.
219

220
DMR Fr
Funding,supra note 2 17.
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'If the money's not there, there will be no services. If the services aren't provided, we're going to end up back in court.' 221
In an attempt to obtain a reversal of the budget cuts other
than through litigation, Sarkissian and plaintiffs' attorneys organized a demonstration to protest the multi-million dollar
budget cuts effecting the Department of Mental Retardation. 2 2
After a week's worth of intensive pressure from advocacy
groups, legislative leaders decided on December 13, 2001 that
they would restore funding to a variety of programs, including
the Department of Mental Retardation, 3 by passing an $85 million supplemental budget.224 While the supplemental budget
does help to meet the needs of hundred of MR/DD individuals
by restoring the $22 million in annualized funding promised in
the Boulet settlement, countless other individuals are less fortunate. "'[The supplemental budget] makes some modest restorations to the most egregious cuts, but we are still just putting
Band-Aids on deep and open wounds,' said Stephen E. Collins,
Executive
Director of the Massachusetts Human Services Coali22 5
tion.

The fact that the proposed House and Senate budget allocated no money to satisfy the Boulet settlement raises interest-

ing issues that are beyond the scope of this Note, but merit brief
mention. What happens when a court-mandated settlement
agreement is ignored? What is the relief available? The Boulet
plaintiffs rallied, organizing themselves, demonstrated, and effectively used the press to champion their cause. But what if
their efforts had been ineffective? Plaintiffs' attorneys were
successful at exerting political pressure, calling on state representatives to enact a change and enforce the settlement mandated by the courts. And, if they were unsuccessful at enacting
change through non-litigation channels, plaintiffs' counsel was
prepared to go back to court to secure adequate Medicaid services to which their clients were entitled.
221
Budget at the Wire, supranote 216.
2

2DMR Funding,supra note 217.

m The proposed $85 million supplemental budget included allocations for
adult education ($12.5 million), AIDS ($2.5 million), the Department of Mental
Health ($16.6 million), the Department of Mental Retardation ($33.3 million, including $15 million of the $22 million mandated under the Boulet settlement), and the
Department
224 of Correction ($14 million). Budget Cuts, supra note 215.
See id.

= Id.
L
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One lesson-unfortunate, but true-that the Boulet plaintiffs learned as a result of the Massachusetts budget debacle is
that even when all obstacles have seemingly been surmounted
and the case has been won, there is still the danger that the legislature will ignore-and thereby invalidate-the ruling of the
courts. The road ahead for the Boulet plaintiffs and their counsel seems long. In addition to monitoring the implementation of
the settlement, they must remain alert and ever-ready to return
to court to secure the rights to which they and other MR/DD
individuals in the Commonwealth are entitled, for it seems that
only through vigilance will their rights be upheld.

